DISPUTES ARISING FROM VIOLATIONS OF THE PRINCIPLE OF SETOFF AND METHODS OF RESOLUTION
The Law No. 7596 on Certain Investment Funds Ordered to Be Liquidated, dated October 22, 2026, and the crisis that unfolded during this process represent one of the most critical turning points in Turkish legal history in terms of capital markets, settlement security, investor rights, and the liability of the administration. The fund scandal, the fund liquidation law, and the resulting liquidity crisis have sparked intense debates regarding deviations from the principle of settlement finality.
The legislative regulation known as the fund liquidation law should be interpreted in the following context: market realities, the principle of settlement finality, the dynamics of the “exploding debt/share blockage” (PBLK) liquidity crisis, investor grievances, and potential solutions:
1. Debates Regarding Settlement Finality and PBLK
The debates surrounding settlement finality and PBLK are highly technical issues concerning the capital markets infrastructure, and understanding them is of vital importance. This is because the two most fundamental principles forming the backbone of capital markets are settlement finality and market confidence.
One of the fundamental pillars of investor confidence in organized markets is the legal certainty that transactions will be settled—meaning they cannot be reversed later.
In Turkey, one of the most critical elements of this framework is the principle of settlement finality, as stipulated in Article 79 of the Capital Markets Law No. 6362. This article establishes a definitive rule that settlement instructions, transactions, and payment transactions cannot be revoked or canceled, even if the relevant institution ceases operations or enters liquidation.
Internationally, the European Union’s Directive 98/26/EC (Settlement Finality Directive) provides a similar absolute protection for transfer instructions and netting transactions entered into the system in advance.
Furthermore, the central counterparty (CCP) mechanism serves as a separate mechanism that complements this legal finality. Under the EU’s order-matching regulations, the CCP acts as the buyer against every seller and the seller against every buyer. Thus, a buy order is never left without a seller, nor a sell order without a buyer.
In the organized markets operated by Borsa Istanbul, a contract is concluded when buy and sell orders are matched. Takasbank assumes the risk as the CCP in certain markets. This ensures that settlement is final.
The situation is different, however, with the Turkey Electronic Fund Trading Platform (TEFAS). TEFAS is a platform that enables the buying and selling of investment fund shares by a broad public. The direct counterparty to these transactions is the fund sponsor. Takasbank acts solely as the platform operator on TEFAS. It does not assume or fulfill the MKT role as it does on BIST.
There is no doubt that the recent scandal has severely undermined this principle of settlement finality. Under normal circumstances, fund buy and sell orders, securities transfers, and fund movements processed through Takasbank and the Central Securities Depository (MKK) are “final and irrevocable.”
However, pursuant to a decision by the Capital Markets Board (SPK) on September 17, 2026,
7 portfolio management companies
(Hedef Portföy [31 funds],
Pardus Portfolio [42 funds],
Atlas Portföy [16 funds],
Pusula Portfolio [12 funds],
Bulls Portfolio [15 funds],
A1 Capital Portfolio [9 funds], and
Tera Portfolio [5–6 funds])—the crisis that erupted across these 131 funds effectively brought the system’s settlement and asset custody infrastructure to a grinding halt.
The problem stemmed precisely from this: The assets in the fund portfolios appeared to exist on paper. However, these assets were not physically present. Alternatively, the funds had been drained by transferring them to parties involved in sham (unbacked/fraudulent) transactions.
The inability to liquidate assets in the portfolios, leveraged transactions, reverse repo mismatches, and asset prices that did not reflect reality triggered a deep liquidity and payment crisis.
In financial markets, PBLK (Pay Bloke / Exploding Debt and Liquidity Crisis) is a term describing sudden crisis situations arising from the inability to convert assets into cash, the failure to repay debts, and the freezing of reverse repo and leveraged mechanisms within the context of fund crises.
The technical operation of PBLK within TEFAS and MKS (Central Securities Depository) is as follows:
Buy and sell orders submitted by TEFAS member institutions are processed in the Takasbank system.
Takasbank transfers the matched data to the MKS at MKK.
The fund shares subject to the sell order are blocked in the “PBLK” (Share Block) subaccount within the investor’s account.
To complete the settlement, these shares are transferred to the fund sponsor’s issuance pool, while the cash is credited to the member’s account at the settlement time.
The fund crisis arose because these transactions did not proceed as described. This was because the assets in the funds either did not exist at all or had been transferred to others. With the sudden liquidation decisions, this mechanism within TEFAS became locked up; the orders of hundreds of thousands of investors remained pending, could not be liquidated, and the funds defaulted.
Another significant issue that stood out during this process was the serious contradictions in the administrative decisions of the regulatory authorities:
In the Capital Markets Board’s (SPK) Bulletin No. 2026/61 dated September 17, 2026, it was stated that the settlement amount resulting from fund sales that did not occur despite sell orders being placed on TEFAS would be “recorded as a liability in the fund’s account” and would be “paid out of the cash obtained during liquidation as a matter of priority.”
The term “PBLK” was not explicitly mentioned in this initial decision. Nevertheless, the fund shares subject to these unexecuted sale orders are the shares currently blocked in investors’ PBLK sub-accounts.
In its official statement dated October 22, 2026, however, the SPK adopted the exact opposite approach. It was stated that investors with balances in PBLK are still “fund unit holders,” that these individuals are included among the total of 455,758 fund unit holders, that they do not constitute a separate group of preferred investors, and that they will be treated on equal terms with other participation unit holders under the scope of the legislative proposal. This statement contradicted the previous one.
While the CMB’s initial decision dated September 17 classified the settlement amount for shares in PBLK as a priority fund debt, the October 22 statement and the subsequently enacted Law No. 7596 eliminated this priority right, thereby reducing PBLK victims to the status of ordinary fund unit holders.
Upon analyzing this situation, we observe that the initial decision was made hastily without assessing its potential consequences during the crisis; Takasbank’s revocation of its instructions created massive uncertainty; and Law No. 7596 completely nullified the scope of application of the initial bulletin decision.
Law No. 7596, introduced to prevent systemic risk, on the one hand, carried out an asset rescue operation through state intervention; on the other hand, it has sparked a deep legal debate by subsequently reducing the assets of investors—who had acted in reliance on the principles of legal certainty, acquired rights, and settlement finality—through “net investment amount” and “indexation” formulas.
2. Injustices and Hardships Experienced by Investors
The primary grievances arising from the fund crisis and the subsequent enactment of Law No. 7596 are as follows:
a. Loss of Principal and Returns
When investors put their savings into funds, their goal was to protect themselves from inflation or to earn market returns. This became impossible because the funds went bankrupt due to management that drained their assets. As a result, investors face the risk of losing not only their potential profits but even their principal.
b. Net Investment Amount and CPI/PPI Limits (Article 4)
The most debated issue in the Law is the payment formula set forth in Article 4. This is because it establishes that, in cases where distributable cash is insufficient, payments will be made based on the “Net Investment Amount” (calculated by indexing inflows and outflows using the average TÜİK CPI/PPI and the pro rata method).
This situation means that the actual claim of a beneficiary who has achieved growth in their funds through long-term investments is subject to an administrative cap (e.g., an interim payment cap of 1,000,000 TL). For this reason, it is inevitable that investors will file lawsuits rather than accept this calculation formula and the resulting losses.
c. Blocked Instructions (PBLK) Disputes and Their Two-Way Impact
Investors whose instructions were submitted to TEFAS on or before September 17, 2026, but could not be executed due to the fund’s default and inability to disclose prices—and whose shares were locked in PBLK sub-accounts at MKS—experienced a complete liquidity freeze and uncertainty regarding ownership throughout the process.
Law No. 7596, Article 3/5, addressed this gray area as follows:
"Fund share ownership is determined on a fund- and account-by-account basis by the entities responsible for liquidation through reconciliation with MKK records. Provided, however, that with respect to funds subject to liquidation, for instructions that were transmitted to TEFAS on or before September 17, 2026, but could not be executed due to the fund’s default and/or the failure to disclose the unit price, those whose units have been blocked are subject to the liquidation provisions of this Law in their capacity as fund unit holders.”
This regulation has two legal implications for investors:
From the Perspective of Those Who Issued Sale (Redemption) Instructions (Adverse Situation): An investor who issued a sale instruction to exit the fund prior to the crisis and whose shares remained blocked in the PBLK would normally have been able to convert their shares to cash at that day’s high fund price had the settlement been finalized. However, by classifying them as “fund unit holders” under Article 3/5 of the Law and including them in the liquidation pool—thereby capping their claims at the net investment amount and interim payment ceilings—the Law caused them to suffer a loss of rights.
From the Perspective of Those Who Issued Purchase (Entry) Orders (In Their Favor): Investors who deposited funds to enter the fund but whose shares had not yet been credited to their accounts when the crisis erupted were deemed “fund unit holders” thanks to this provision—which prevented their funds from becoming ownerless and vanishing—and thus gained the right to receive a share from the liquidation and TMSF recovery accounts.
Considering that sell orders far outnumbered buy orders in the market, it is clear that this provision resulted in cumulative adverse consequences for the investor base.
d. Voluntary Return Pressure (Article 4/4)
The “voluntary” demand for the return of profits exceeding the inflation rate from honest investors who sold their fund shares and withdrew their money before the liquidation date created legal unpredictability and a lack of confidence in the market.
3. What Are the Shortcomings, Risks, and Structural Problems in the Law?
Law No. 7596 sought to provide strong administrative tools (TMSF authorities, provisions of Law No. 6183, seizures under Article 128 of the Criminal Procedure Code, and receivership) to manage the systemic crisis. It partially succeeded in this. However, problems stemming from the following structural deficiencies persist.
The cap limits and indexing formulas introduced by the law will be challenged before the Constitutional Court on the grounds that they violate the constitutional right to property (Art. 35).
The recovery of values unjustly extracted from the fund’s assets from the responsible portfolio management companies and individuals (Art. 5) will continue for many years. No matter how effectively the TMSF and procedures under Law No. 6183 operate, the greatest concern is that investors’ claims will remain unpaid if the real value of the distressed assets cannot be determined.
Investors’ ability to pursue enforcement, bankruptcy, and litigation proceedings directly against founders and managers in civil courts has been restricted by the administrative liquidation and TMSF-centered enforcement mechanisms introduced by the law. Although an administrative liquidation framework has been established here, this situation will invite criticism that the freedom to seek justice is being restricted under administrative oversight and will constitute a separate legal issue.
4. Steps to Be Taken to Remedy the Injustice Suffered by Investors
We believe that, given the current legal framework and administrative mechanisms, the roadmap investors must follow to protect their rights and minimize their losses consists of two main components.
A. Full Integration into Administrative Mechanisms
Investors must promptly confirm their registrations with the Central Securities Depository (MKK, e-Investor) and the entities responsible for liquidation, as well as their PBLK balances and their status as “fund unit holders.”
They should monitor the payment schedules for the sub-accounts (recovery accounts) established with the TMSF and YTM, and take full advantage of the interim payment caps (1,000,000 TL) and net investment amount calculations.
B. Judicial Remedies and Claims for Damages
If the administrative liquidation mechanism proves insufficient to cover the investor’s entire loss (particularly actual losses and lost profits), judicial recourse is the last resort.
Full-Fledged Lawsuits in Administrative Courts: It is highly likely that full-fledged (damages) lawsuits will be filed against the Treasury and the Capital Markets Board (SPK) in the Istanbul Administrative Courts—as specified in Article 5/4 of the Law—on the grounds that the SPK neglected its oversight and supervision duties (negligence in the performance of duties) while authorizing the establishment, supervision, and operations of these funds.
Compensation and Criminal Proceedings Against Responsible Parties Under General Provisions: Apart from the statutory liquidation process and TMSF proceedings, compensation lawsuits under the Turkish Code of Obligations for tort (Article 49) and the provisions of the Turkish Commercial Code, as well as criminal complaints under Article 158 (Aggravated Fraud) and abuse of trust must be pursued with determination.
In summary, although Law No. 7596 consolidates the crisis and channels it into a liquidation pool under state supervision, it falls far short of fully redressing the injustice to investors’ property rights and breach of trust.
In addition to administrative processes, reserving the right to and pursuing individual full-fledged judicial and compensation claims is a legal necessity for the comprehensive defense of investors’ rights.