FUND SCANDAL – LEGAL ASSESSMENT OF THE SETTLEMENT FINALITY PRINCIPLE AND THE LIQUIDITY CRISIS IN LIGHT OF THE FUND LIQUIDATION LAW
Law No. 7596 on Certain Investment Funds Resolved to Be Liquidated (the "Fund Liquidation Law") and the crisis experienced throughout this process represent one of the most critical turning points in Turkish legal history regarding capital markets, clearing and settlement safety, investor rights, and administrative liability. The recent fund scandal and the fund liquidation legislation have brought forth deep debates concerning the liquidity crisis and deviations from the principle of settlement finality.
The statutory regulation, widely referred to as the Fund Liquidation Law, must be evaluated within the context of market realities, the principle of settlement finality, the dynamics of the Bursting Debt – Liquidity Crisis (PBLK), investor grievances, and avenues of legal recourse.
Debates surrounding settlement finality and PBLK represent highly technical and complex subjects. It is essential to understand them in a straightforward and clear manner, as settlement finality and market confidence constitute the two foundational pillars forming the backbone of capital markets.
It is evident that the principle of settlement finality was severely undermined in this scandal. Under normal circumstances, fund subscription and redemption orders, securities transfers, and cash movements executed through Takasbank (Istanbul Settlement and Custody Bank) and the MKK (Central Securities Depository) are recognized as "final and irrevocable."
However, the crisis that erupted on September 17, 2026, across 131 funds managed by 7 portfolio management companies shattered the mechanisms and core principles of the system's settlement and asset custody infrastructure.
The precise issue is as follows: assets in fund portfolios appeared on paper to be intact. In reality, however, these assets were either physically non-existent or had been siphoned off and transferred to other entities through collusive and fraudulent transactions. This state of affairs has severely shaken faith in the principle of settlement finality.
The dynamics of the Bursting Debt – Liquidity Crisis (PBLK) can be summarized as follows: when assets within fund portfolios are either fictitious or have been transferred in a collusive (sham or deceptive) manner, and therefore cannot be converted into cash, leveraged transactions, reverse repo mismatches, and asset prices disconnected from economic reality trigger an acute liquidity and payment crisis. In capital market terminology, this is succinctly referred to as PBLK. In the context of fund crises and market bottlenecks, PBLK defines sudden liquidity and payment crises that emerge when assets cannot be realized in cash, liabilities become insurmountable, and financial mechanisms such as reverse repurchase agreements and leveraged positions freeze.
The primary trigger of the crisis was the abrupt enactment of liquidation decisions. Due to these sudden liquidation decisions, orders submitted via TEFAS by hundreds of thousands of investors who purchased fund units were suspended, and the funds defaulted.
The legal controversies surrounding these events can be outlined as follows: Law No. 7596, enacted to avert systemic risk, functions on one hand as a state-sponsored asset salvage operation. On the other hand, the Law sparks intense controversy regarding the principles of legal certainty, vested rights, and the protection of legitimate expectations of investors who traded relying upon settlement finality, whose assets are subsequently recomputed under administrative "net investment amount" or "indexing" formulas.
2. Grievances and Injustices Experienced by Investors
We identify the foremost grievances generated by the fund crisis and the subsequent enactment of Law No. 7596 as follows:
Above all, we are confronted with a clear loss of principal and return. When investors entrusted their savings to funds, they sought protection against inflation or aimed to achieve market returns. However, the funds collapsed due to management that stripped their assets. Consequently, far from earning a return, investors found themselves facing the severe peril of losing their initial principal.
The most prominent and hotly debated provision in the Law is the limitation based on net investment amount and CPI/PPI indexing—namely, Article 4 of the Law. Under this provision, where distributable cash is insufficient, distributions are mandated to be calculated based on the "net investment amount" (indexed to the average of CPI/PPI for inflows and outflows).
This arrangement means that the genuine claim of a rights holder who maintained long-term investments and achieved growth in fund units is subjected to an administrative ceiling cap (e.g., an interim distribution cap of TRY 1,000,000). This results in a grave loss of rights. Investors are unlikely to endure this calculation formula and their resulting damages, making litigation an anticipated legal development.
Grievances regarding blocked orders constitute another major issue. Investors whose orders were transmitted to TEFAS on or before September 17, 2026, but could not be executed due to fund defaults—resulting in their participation units being blocked—endured protracted uncertainty and liquidity lockups throughout this process.
To recall, immediately prior to or on the date the CMB resolved to liquidate the relevant funds on September 17, 2026, a substantial volume of fund purchase and redemption orders had been entered into the system (specifically via TEFAS – Turkish Electronic Fund Distribution Platform).
However, owing to defaults within fund portfolios, liquidity freezes, and the inability to declare unit prices, these orders could not be finalized. Transactions could neither be fully settled and reflected in accounts nor cancelled. Consequently, investors' cash or participation units remained frozen, stranded in complete legal limbo. This created a severe liquidity trap and property ambiguity for investors.
Law No. 7596 introduced an explicit statutory status to eliminate this critical gray area. Article 3, paragraph 5 of the Law directly addresses this matter:
"Fund unit ownership shall be determined on a fund and account basis by the institutions charged with liquidation through reconciliation with MKK records. Provided, however, that regarding the funds subject to liquidation, holders of orders transmitted to TEFAS on or before September 17, 2026, which could not be executed due to the default of the relevant fund and/or the non-disclosure of the unit price, and whose participation units have been blocked, shall be subject to the liquidation provisions of this Law in the capacity of fund unit holders."
To elaborate: individuals whose orders were submitted to TEFAS on or before September 17, 2026, but could not be executed due to fund default or the failure to announce unit prices—and whose participation units were consequently blocked—were legally recognized as rights holders ("fund unit holders") in the liquidation process. This provision yields unfavorable consequences for those who previously intended to sell but could not, while yielding favorable results for those who intended to buy but could not. That is, if the investor's objective was to exit the fund (redemption) and they would have received their funds in full had the order not been impeded, this provision operates to their detriment, as they are drawn into the liquidation pool where their claim is trimmed. Conversely, if the objective was to enter the fund (subscription), the provision works to their advantage by preventing their funds from hanging in suspension and granting them legal standing as a claimant. Given that redemption orders vastly outnumbered subscription orders, this provision does not offer cumulatively beneficial outcomes for investors.
By being brought under the liquidation regime, investors in this position were legally afforded equal rights alongside other investors to benefit from administrative liquidation under the Law, net investment amount calculations, interim payment mechanisms, and TMSF/YTM recovery accounts.
Voluntary clawback pressure (Article 4/4): Requesting that investors who sold their units and withdrew their money prior to the liquidation date "voluntarily" return earnings exceeding inflation created widespread perceptions of legal unpredictability across the market. This raised serious questions regarding trust and foreseeability for bona fide investors who made early exits.
3. Structural Deficiencies, Risks, and Issues in the Law
Law No. 7596 provides powerful administrative instruments (TMSF powers, procedural expediencies under Law No. 6183, asset seizures pursuant to Article 128 of the Criminal Procedure Code) to manage fund scandals and this unprecedented crisis. Nonetheless, it undeniably contains the following structural shortcomings:
The most contentious issue is the risk of infringing upon the right to property. The statutory ceilings and indexing formulas introduced by the Law give rise to serious norm-control risks that may be brought before the Constitutional Court (AYM) on the grounds of violating the constitutional right to property (Article 35 of the Constitution). It appears inevitable that this matter will reach the Constitutional Court in one form or another. In that event, the paramount necessity is avoiding a judicial review process that drags on for years.
Uncertainty in loss recovery has remained on the table every day since the fund scandal erupted. Recovering assets unlawfully extracted from fund estates from responsible portfolio management companies and executives (Article 5) may take many years. Regardless of how effectively TMSF and Law No. 6183 procedures operate, the shortfall in fund unit holders' claims if non-performing assets cannot achieve their market values represents the most pressing concern.
The curtailment of individual litigation rights is another notable concern. Certain commentators argue that investors' ability to file direct lawsuits in civil courts against founders and directors and swiftly initiate attachment proceedings has been restricted by the statutory administrative liquidation and TMSF-centered collection monopoly. We do not share this view, as such an interpretation would invite severe criticism that the constitutional freedom to seek legal remedies has been curtailed under administrative supervision.
4. Steps Required to Remedy Injustices Suffered by Investors
Faced with the current statutory framework and administrative mechanisms, the roadmap that investors must follow to protect their rights and minimize losses comprises two main pillars:
A. Complete Integration into Administrative Mechanisms
MKK and liquidation reconciliations must be monitored: Investors must promptly verify the accuracy of their records with the MKK and the entities tasked with liquidation, confirming their status as "fund unit holders" without delay.
Applications to recovery accounts must be submitted: Payment schedules for sub-accounts established under the TMSF and the YTM (recovery accounts) must be closely tracked, and maximum advantage must be taken of interim payment ceilings (TRY 1,000,000) and net investment amount computations.
B. Judicial Recourse and Actions for Damages
Where the administrative liquidation mechanism proves insufficient to cover the investor's entire loss (particularly real economic losses and lost profits), judicial recourse represents the avenue of last resort.
Investors whose damages are not fully remedied will initiate full remedy actions (actions for damages) in administrative courts. There is a high probability of numerous full remedy actions being filed against the Treasury and the Capital Markets Board (CMB) before the Istanbul Administrative Courts designated by the Law, alleging administrative negligence (fault of administration) on grounds that the CMB neglected its statutory oversight and supervisory duties when authorizing the establishment, operation, and auditing of these funds.
Another avenue is filing actions for damages against responsible parties under general provisions of private law. Outside statutory liquidation and TMSF collection procedures, civil damages lawsuits and criminal complaints will be brought against fund executives, custodians, controlling shareholders, and portfolio management company officers who siphoned off fund assets, pursuant to the tort provisions of the Turkish Code of Obligations and the Turkish Commercial Code.
In summary: although Law No. 7596 aggregates the crisis into a state-supervised liquidation pool, it falls short of entirely curing the injustices suffered by investors concerning property rights and legal confidence. Alongside administrative procedures, preserving and pursuing individual full remedy actions and civil damages claims will emerge as a vital legal necessity for the comprehensive defense of investor rights.