OUR PUBLICATIONS

Blockchain Based Digital Identity and Tokenization: Technical and Legal Analysis for Turkey


29 June 2025 - Av. SERCAN KOÇ

Blockchain Based Digital Identity and Tokenization: Technical and Legal Analysis for Turkey

 


The New Paradigm of Digital Identity and Turkey's Strategic Position

In the twenty-first century, where digitalization permeates every aspect of life, identity management has become one of the most fundamental and strategic issues for individuals, organizations and governments. Traditional identity systems are based on an architecture where data is controlled in centralized silos, often by large technology companies or government agencies. This model has led to serious vulnerabilities such as data breaches, erosion of privacy and lack of user control. In response to these vulnerabilities, a new paradigm built on blockchain technology has emerged that gives individuals full control and ownership over their digital identities: Self-Sovereign Identity (SSI).

This transformation is not only a technical innovation, but also a philosophical revolution that fundamentally reshapes the individual's existence in the digital world. Turkey, not wanting to be left out of this global transformation, has adopted a vision in this field. The Digital Transformation Office of the Presidency of the Republic announced that a blockchain-based digital identity and e-wallet application will be implemented for accessing the e-Government Gateway.

However, the successful realization of this vision requires the construction of a complex structure built on two pillars full compliance with global technical standards and harmonious integration of the existing national legal framework with this new technology. The main objective of this report is to analyze in depth the set of intersections between these two pillars. This report aims to anatomize the technical standards developed by international organizations such as the World Wide Web Consortium (W3C) and the Decentralized Identity Foundation (DIF), while revealing their interactions, potential conflicts and opportunities with the Personal Data Protection Law No. 6698 (KVKK), the Electronic Signature Law No. 5070 and other key Turkish legislation.


Chapter 1: Global Technical Framework and Methodology: Anatomy of Decentralized Identity

This chapter comprehensively examines the technologies, standards and philosophy underpinning blockchain-based digital identity systems, centering on the work of standard-setting bodies such as the W3C and DIF. It is essential to establish a solid and nuanced understanding of how the technology works before moving on to legal analysis.

1.1. Philosophy and Basic Principles of Self-Sovereign Identity (SSI)

Self-Sovereign Identity (SSI) is a digital identity model that gives individuals full control, ownership and autonomy over their digital identities and personal data. This model places the user at the center of the identity ecosystem, unlike traditional systems where data is stored and managed by centralized authorities or intermediaries. It offers a fundamental alternative to data models in the Web 2.0 era, where large corporations control and commoditize personal data. SSI's core philosophy is based on the assumption that digital identity should be under the direct control of its owner, just like the ID cards in our physical wallet.

The basic framework that translates this philosophy into a technical architecture is the 10 core principles laid out by Christopher Allen in 2016. These principles define the characteristics that an SSI system should have and guide the design of the system:

  • Existence: Users do not need permission from any central authority or institution to have a digital identity. The identity can exist independently of the user's own will.
  • Control: The user is the ultimate authority of their identity. He alone decides with whom, when and under what conditions he shares his identity data. He/she has full control over this data.
  • Access: Users should always have unmediated access to their identity data. They should not need an intermediary or "gatekeeper" to access their data.
  • Transparency: The algorithms and infrastructure that govern the identity system should be open, transparent and auditable. This ensures that everyone can understand and trust how the system works.
  • Persistence: Digital identities should be long-lasting, preferably permanent, without being affected by technology or platform changes. The identity should continue to exist as long as the user wants it to.
  • Portability: Users should be able to easily move identity data and credentials from one service provider or platform to another. Data should not be locked in a single silo.
  • Interoperability: Identities must be able to work seamlessly across different systems, applications and geographic boundaries. This forms the basis of a globally usable identity infrastructure.
  • Consent: Any sharing or use of a user's identity data must be based on the user's informed and free consent. Consent must be obtained separately and specifically for each transaction.
  • Data Minimization: No more data should be shared than is necessary for a transaction. To prove a claim, the user should only have the ability to disclose the minimum information relevant to that claim.
  • Protection: The system should be designed to maximize the protection of users' rights and the security of their data. The rights of the individual take precedence over all other requirements of the system.

These ten principles serve as a litmus paper for a technology to be considered "SSI compliant" and are the raison d'être for the technical components that follow.

1.2. Decentralized Identifiers (DIDs): The Address Book of Digital Sovereignty

Decentralized Identifiers (DIDs) are the fundamental building block of the SSI architecture. Recommended by the W3C as a web standard, DIDs are a new type of globally unique, persistent and cryptographically verifiable identifier that does not need a central registration authority (e.g., a government or a domain registrar). A DID can represent a person, an organization, an object or any entity.

The basic structure of a DID is did:method:specific-identifier. For example, a DID in the format did:ethr:0xf3beac30c498d9e26865f34fcaa57dbb935b0d74 is an identifier that uses the ethr (Ethereum) method and is associated with a specific Ethereum address.

1.2.1. DID Lifecycle

The management of a DID revolves around four basic cryptographic operations defined by W3C:

  1. Create: In this phase, a user (or software acting on their behalf) generates one or more asymmetric cryptographic key pairs (a public key and a private key). Based on these keys, a DID Document is created containing a unique DID and metadata (e.g. public keys, service endpoints) related to this DID.
  2. Resolve (Read/Resolve): This operation is used when a party wants to use a DID to obtain the current DID Document for that DID. This operation is performed by a software component called "DID Resolver". The Resolver finds and returns the relevant document by following rules specific to the DID's method (for example, by querying a blockchain or sending a request to a web server).
  3. Update: A DID owner performs this operation when they want to make changes to the DID Document (e.g. rotate a key, add a new service endpoint or remove an existing one). This is done by sending an update message that the controller of the DID (usually the owner of the private key) authorizes with a cryptographic signature.
  4. Deactivate: The process of invalidating a DID by its controller when it is no longer to be used. This operation is performed by a cryptographic operation indicating that the DID can no longer be resolved or will be marked as "canceled".

1.2.2. DID Methods: Different Ways for Different Needs

While standardizing the basic syntax and data model of DIDs, the W3C has allowed for a variety of "DID methods" that define how these standards can be implemented on different infrastructures. This flexibility provides optimized solutions for different use cases, while at the same time requiring careful attention to interoperability. The differences between the most common and basic DID methods are critical for technology and policy choice.

The following compares the three main DID methods on key criteria. Each method has its own advantages and disadvantages, cost structures and security assumptions. However, it should not be forgotten that there are other methods and these methods can be developed and differentiated.

1.2.3. Comparative Analysis of Basic DID Methods

did:key

Infrastructure. No blockchain required. The DID is derived directly from a cryptographic public key. This system is completely self-sufficient, requiring no external registry or network connectivity.

Generation/Resolution. DIDs are created on-the-fly and offline. Resolution is done algorithmically from the public key information embedded in the DID. No internet connection or external service is required.

Cost and Speed. Completely free of charge. There are no gas fees or transaction costs. Transaction speed is instantaneous.

Security and Trust Model. Security is entirely dependent on protecting the private key. Decentralized, but there is no public ledger, so there is no historical tracking.

Key Rotation/Recovery. Not supported. When the key is lost or compromised, the DID becomes permanently dysfunctional. This is a serious security vulnerability.

Typical Uses. Temporary identities, test scenarios, peer-to-peer communications, low-risk offline use cases, one-time identity declarations.

did:ethr

Infrastructure. It runs on the Ethereum blockchain. The management of DIDs is handled through a smart contract called ethr-did-registry.

Creation/Resolution. Creating and updating DIDs is done by sending transactions to the Ethereum network and requires a gas fee. Resolution is done through historical events (event logs) stored in the smart contract.

Cost and Speed. The cost varies depending on the gas fees on Ethereum. Cost may increase as network density increases. Speed is limited by block confirmation time.

Security and Trust Model. Security relies on Ethereum's Proof-of-Stake consensus mechanism and large node network. The cryptographic and economic security model is strong.

Key Rotation/Recovery. Supported. The DID owner can change keys, add new keys, or delegate through the contract.

Typical Use Cases. Decentralized applications (dApps), DAO memberships, interactive identity structures with smart contracts, Ethereum-based identity projects.

did:ion

Infrastructure. It is built on a Layer-2 protocol called Sidetree. Operations are recorded in IPFS, with hash data periodically anchored to the Bitcoin blockchain. This structure ensures both content and time sequence security.

Creation/Resolution. Operations are published over IPFS. The resolution process is based on the data received from IPFS, taking into account the time sequence on Bitcoin.

Cost and Speed. The cost is low because it works with batch logic. However, there may be a certain latency due to the process of writing to Bitcoin.

Security and Trust Model. The security model based on the immutability of Bitcoin and the content-addressing feature of IPFS is very strong. It is highly decentralized and censorship-resistant.

Key Rotation/Recovery. Supported. Thanks to the recovery keys defined when creating the DID, control can be taken back even in case of loss of operation keys.

Typical Use Cases. Systems that require high security and longevity such as government-based digital identities, university diplomas, land registries. Ideal for corporate and public identity infrastructures.

1.3. Verifiable Credentials (VCs): Building Blocks of Cryptographic Trust

If DIDs are the address book of the identity ecosystem, Verifiable Credentials (VCs) are the trusted statements attributed to the addresses in this book. Standardized by the W3C, VCs are the digital, cryptographically secure, privacy-oriented and machine-automatically verifiable equivalents of identity documents such as driver's licenses, diplomas and passports in the physical world.

1.3.1. W3C VC Data Model and Trust Triangle

The VC ecosystem is based on the interaction between three key roles. This interaction is referred to as the "Triangle of Trust":

  1. Issuer: The entity that creates a VC containing one or more claims about a subject and cryptographically signs it with its private key. For example, a university (for a diploma), a registry office (for an ID card) or a bank (for a credit score) could be an issuer.
  2. Holder: The person who receives the VC from the issuer, stores it securely in a digital wallet under their control, and decides with whom and when to share it. Usually represents the end user.
  3. Verifier: The party that requests the Holder to provide a VC to provide a service or authorize a transaction and cryptographically verifies the integrity and authenticity of that VC. For example, an employer (to verify a diploma), a bar (to verify age) or a car rental company (to verify a driver's license) is a verifier.

The most revolutionary aspect of this model is that the Verifier does not have to communicate directly and instantaneously with the Regulator to verify a VC. Verification can be done completely offline via the cryptographic signature on the VC and the Regulator's public key published on the blockchain or other trusted ledger. This increases privacy and is not a burden on the Regulator.

1.3.2. Anatomy of a VC

According to the W3C VC Data Model, a VC is typically expressed in JSON-LD (JavaScript Object Notation for Linked Data) format and contains the following basic components

  • @context: An array of one or more URLs that define what the terms in the VC (e.g. "issuer", "name") mean semantically. This ensures that different systems interpret the VC in the same way.
  • id: A globally unique identifier for the VC itself.
  • type: Specifies the type of the VC.
  • issuer: Contains the DID of the organization that issued the VC. This allows the verifier to know where to find the public key required for the signature.
  • issuanceDate: A timestamp indicating the date and time the VC was issued.
  • credentialSubject: The most important part of the VC. It contains the person to whom the credential belongs (the Owner) and the claims about that person. The owner is usually identified by their DID. Claims are keywords like name: "Ali Veli", degree: "Computer Engineering Bachelor", birthDate: "1990-01-15", etc. key-value pairs.
  • credentialSchema: Optional but critical for interoperability, this field references a schema (usually a JSON Schema) that defines the structure of the VC and the expected data types and formats. This allows a validator to programmatically check that the VC it receives is in the expected format.
  • proof: This section contains the cryptographic proof that proves the integrity (that its content has not been modified) and authenticity (that it was signed by the specified issuer) of the VC. It usually consists of a digital signature generated with the issuer's private key.

1.4. Tokenization of Identity: On-Chain Representation of Asset and Reputation

Identity tokenization is the process of transforming intangible credentials, rights and reputation into tangible digital assets - "tokens" - that can be traded or transferred on the blockchain. This adds new dimensions to identity management such as ownership, portability and composability.

1.4.1. NFTs (ERC-721/ERC-1155): Proven Ownership Identity Documents

Non-Fungible Tokens (NFTs) are digital assets, each of which is unique and non-fungible. This makes them suitable for representing singular and valuable identity documents.

ERC-721. It is the original and most common NFT standard on Ethereum. Each token has a unique ID and a single smart contract often represents a collection. It is ideal for tokenizing "one-of-a-kind" documents such as a person's university diploma, the title deed to a property or a private certificate. Representing a driver's license as an ERC-721 NFT gives the holder the possibility to cryptographically prove the digital ownership of this document. This NFT can be used to offer credentials on different platforms (car rental, insurance, etc.). Sensitive data (address, ID number, etc.) is usually stored off-chain and encrypted in the NFT's metadata, while the NFT itself serves as proof of ownership, validity and authenticity.

ERC-1155. ERC-1155, also known as the "Multi-Token Standard", offers the ability to manage both unique (non-fungible) and identical (fungible) token types within a single smart contract. This provides efficiency and cost benefits. For example, it is much more efficient to issue attendee certificates to 1000 people attending a conference as one "attendee certificate" token type of 1000 under a single ERC-1155 contract, rather than creating a separate ERC-721 token for each.

NFT-based identity documents offer advantages such as easy proof of ownership and the ability to transfer digital assets on open markets (if desired).

1.4.2. Soulbound Tokens (SBTs): Inalienable Reputation and Identity

Proposed by Ethereum co-founder Vitalik Buterin and his team, Soulbound Tokens (SBTs) are tokens that, unlike NFTs, are permanently tied to a wallet ("Soul") that cannot be transferred or sold once created. This "non-transferability" makes them important not for their market value, but for the semantic value they carry, and prevents identity and reputation from becoming a commodity.

Use Cases. SBTs function as a proof of a person's identity, achievements, memberships and relationships. For example:

  • "Graduation SBT" given by a university to its graduates.
  • The "Employee SBT" that a company gives to its employees.
  • The "Governance SBT" that a Decentralized Autonomous Organization (DAO) gives to voting members.
  • "Proof of Participation SBT", which a person receives from the events they attend.36

Potential Risks and Challenges. SBTs carry revolutionary potential but also serious risks:

  • Social Scoring: The greatest concern is the potential for SBTs to be used, particularly by authoritarian regimes, as a tool to monitor and score citizens based on their behavior. A negative SBT (e.g. "bad debtor" or "protester") in a person's wallet could prevent that person from participating in social and economic life.39
  • Privacy and Unwanted SBTs: The public availability of a wallet address allows anyone to send unwanted or malicious SBTs to that address. This can be used to tarnish a person's reputation or harass them. It is therefore critical that users have mechanisms to hide or reject incoming SBTs.
  • Key Loss and Recovery: If a user loses their wallet's private keys, they may permanently lose their SBTs, which are non-transferable. Mechanisms such as "community recovery" have been proposed as a solution to this problem. In this model, trusted individuals or organizations (family, friends, employers, etc.) that the user has previously identified come together to confirm their identity and allow the recovery of SBTs to a new wallet. However, how to implement this mechanism in a secure and practical way is still a matter of active research.

1.4.3. Token Linked Accounts (ERC-6551): NFTs as Identity Agents

ERC-6551 is a new Ethereum standard that was introduced in 2023, creating a paradigm shift in the NFT ecosystem. This standard ensures that each ERC-721 NFT has its own, fully functional smart contract wallet (Token Bound Account - TBA).

This development transforms NFTs from static, owned digital images into dynamic, interactive and autonomous "identity agents". With a TBA, an NFT can now

  • Asset Ownership: Through its TBA, an NFT can own other crypto assets (ETH, stablecoins), other NFTs and various tokens.
  • Interaction with dApps: An NFT can interact with decentralized applications (dApps) with its own identity. For example, it can borrow in a DeFi protocol or vote in a DAO.
  • Transaction History Retention: All interactions of the NFT are recorded in the transaction history of its TBA, separate from its owner's main wallet. This creates a reputation and history unique to that identity.41

This capability gives rise to a powerful concept called "composability". Identity and assets can now be intertwined. For example, consider a "Digital Citizenship NFT". Thanks to ERC-6551, this NFT can hold its holder's digital driver's license (another NFT), health insurance policy (an SBT), e-voting rights (a governance token), and even social benefit payments from the government (stablecoins). It offers a future where digital identity is not just a set of declarations, but a living, interacting and value-accumulating entity.

1.5. Technical implementation and privacy maximization

The practical implementation of these advanced identity systems and the ultimate protection of user privacy rely on two key technologies: digital wallets and zero-knowledge proofs.

1.5.1. The Role of Digital Wallets: Transformation into an Identity Agency

Modern digital wallets are rapidly moving away from being passive tools that only store cryptocurrencies. In the SSI ecosystem, wallets function as active "identity agents" that enforce the user's sovereignty in the digital world. These wallets

  • Securely generate and manage cryptographic keys on behalf of the user.
  • Request and receive VCs from issuers.
  • Store received VCs in an encrypted and secure manner.
  • Forwards presentation requests from authenticators to the user.
  • With the user's consent, selectively presents the requested credentials (either a full VC or an ACP) to the Verifier.

Turkey's planned "e-wallet" application for e-Government is an important step towards this model where citizens can securely store their digital information on their mobile phones. These wallets are the interfaces through which the control and privacy promised by SSI are realized.

1.5.2. Zero-Knowledge Proofs (ZKPs): Proof Without Demonstration

Zero Knowledge Proofs (ZKPs) are one of the most powerful tools in cryptography. It allows one party (the prover) to prove to another party (the verifier) that a given statement is true, without leaking any additional information (the content of the statement, the data on which it is based, etc.) other than the truth of that statement. This technology is the purest technical implementation of SSI's "data minimization" principle.

Selective Disclosure with VC and ZKP

The most powerful use case for ZKPs in identity management is in combination with "Verifiable Credentials". Instead of sharing the full set of credentials to access a service, a user can present an ACP based on the required information.

Concrete Example Age Verification

    1. Obtaining a VC Ali obtains a "Digital Identity VC" from the digital platform of the Civil Registry Office (Issuer), containing information such as his name, surname, date of birth (15.01.1995), and registers it in his wallet (Holder).
    2. Request for Evidence: Ali wants to access an e-commerce website (Verifier) selling alcoholic beverages. The website asks Ali to prove that he is "over 18 years old".
    3. Generating a CCP: Instead of sending the date of birth information to the site, Ali's wallet runs a ZKP circuit that uses this information as input. This circuit generates a mathematical proof that answers "yes" to the question "is the given date of birth more than 18 years older than today's date?". This proof does not include Ali's date of birth or age; it only proves that the claim (being 18+) is true.
    4. Verification: Ali's wallet sends this small ZKP to the e-commerce site. The site mathematically verifies this proof. If the verification is successful, the site knows with 100% certainty that Ali is over 18 years old, never knowing his birthday or exact age, and allows him to make purchases on the site.

This process is called "selective disclosure", and with ZKPs, users have absolute control over what part of their data they disclose and when.

For more detailed information about Zero Knowledge Proof technology, you can read the article I wrote on the use of this technology in the banking sector, you can access the article from the link: ZK-Based Banking Services: Necessity for Privacy and Security


Chapter 2: Interaction with the Turkish Legal System: Harmonization, Conflict and Opportunities

This section will comprehensively analyze how the decentralized identity technologies detailed in the first section will interact with Turkey's existing legal infrastructure, where they have the potential for compatibility and incompatibility, and what opportunities this interaction may create.

2.1. Interaction with the Personal Data Protection Law No. 6698 (KVKK)

The decentralized, distributed and immutable nature of blockchain and SSI technologies creates tensions with the basic principles of the PDPL, which is largely based on the assumption of the existence of a centralized "data controller". These tensions are seen as the most important legal obstacles to the implementation of the technology in Turkey.

2.1.1. Who are the Data Controller and Data Processor? The Distributed Nature of Responsibility

Article 3 of the LPPD defines "data controller" as the natural or legal person who determines the purposes and means of processing personal data and is responsible for the establishment and management of the data recording system. The "data processor" is the person who processes personal data on behalf of the data controller based on the authorization granted by the data controller.

Determining these roles in the SSI ecosystem is complex. The SSI philosophy gives the user (the Holder) ultimate control over their data, making them the primary decision maker. However, recognizing each citizen as a full "data controller" under the PDPL would impose practically impossible and disproportionate legal obligations on them, such as drafting a disclosure document. This is incompatible with the spirit of the LPPD, which aims at institutional structures.

This complex structure clearly shows that the classical "data controller/data processor" distinction is insufficient. The roles of the actors in the eco-system can be evaluated from a more nuanced perspective as follows:

  • Issuer: A data controller who, when creating and signing a credential (VC), is responsible for the accuracy and lawful collection of the data contained in that VC.
  • Verifier: A data controller when it requests a VC from a user and processes this data for its own purposes (e.g. opening a customer record).
  • Holder (Holder/User): A central actor who stores data in their wallet and decides with whom to share it. However, its legal status is unclear.
  • Network Infrastructure (Node Operators): The legal status of the thousands of node operators who verify and record transactions on an open and permissionless blockchain network (e.g. Ethereum) is the most controversial issue. Can these operators be considered "data processors" because they only perform cryptographic operations without knowing the content of the data? Or are they just infrastructure providers?

This structure is closer to a "joint-controllership" model, which also has a place in the GDPR, rather than a model with a single data controller. In this model, the Controller, Owner and Verifier are jointly responsible for different stages of the data processing chain within their respective areas of responsibility. For example;

  • Regulators are concerned about the accuracy of the data,
  • Owners are responsible for the secure storage and consensual sharing of data,
  • Validators, on the other hand

for the subsequent lawful use of the data after it is received. Interpreting or updating the LPPD to recognize such distributed liability models would be a critical step to pave the way for technology.

2.1.2. Explicit Consent and Disclosure Obligation

Article 5 of the LPPD requires the "explicit consent of the data subject" as a basic condition for the processing of personal data. Explicit consent is defined as "consent regarding a specific subject matter, based on information and expressed with free will". SSI wallets have the potential to technically fulfill this definition perfectly. Before each data sharing transaction, the wallet clearly presents to the user what data will be shared, for what purpose and with whom, and obtains a specific consent (with a single click or biometric verification) from the user. This realizes the granular, instant and informed consent mechanism sought by the LPPD.

In terms of the disclosure obligation (Article 10 of the LPPD), data controllers (Regulator and Verifier) are obliged to provide the necessary disclosure texts through their interfaces. The user can read and approve the disclosure text of the Regulator before obtaining a VC and the Verifier before submitting a VC through their wallet.

2.1.3. The Right to be Forgotten: The Myth of Immutability and Cryptographic Solutions

The most fundamental and most discussed point of conflict between KVKK and blockchain technology is the right to "erasure, destruction or anonymization of personal data" regulated in Article 7 of KVKK and the fact that blockchains are "immutable" by nature. Once data is written to a blockchain, it is theoretically impossible to remove it from there.

However, this conflict often arises from a misunderstanding. In modern and well-designed SSI systems, sensitive personal data itself is never written to a public blockchain. This is a basic design principle. Here's what is written to the blockchain:

  • User's Decentralized Identifier (DID).
  • Cryptographic evidence (e.g. a hash value or a commitment) pointing to the existence or status (valid/canceled) of a VC.
  • Updates to revocation lists.

The VC containing the actual personal data is stored encrypted in an off-chain environment, such as a wallet controlled by the user. This architecture provides technical solutions for the "right to be forgotten":

  1. Erasure of Off-Chain Data: When a user deletes a VC in their wallet, the personal data itself disappears. The on-chain proof becomes meaningless cryptographic data that no longer has any meaning.
  2. Destruction of the Cryptographic Key: Even if the data is encrypted in the chain, the irreversible destruction of the private key, the only key that can decrypt it, renders the data practically permanently inaccessible. This method is known as "cryptographic erasure".
  3. Revocation: The issuer can declare that a VC is no longer valid by recording it in a revocation list on the blockchain. While this does not erase the data itself, it removes its legal and practical validity.

The main legal question here is whether these technical methods legally fulfill the acts of "erasure" or "destruction" required by the PDPL. Considering the development of technology, the Personal Data Protection Authority's development of a technology-neutral interpretation that recognizes methods such as "cryptographic erasure" as a valid application of the act of "destruction" can solve this important knot and pave the way for technology.

2.1.4. Data Transfer Abroad

Article 9 of the LPPD stipulates strict rules for the transfer of personal data abroad. For the transfer, either the explicit consent of the data subject or the existence of adequate protection in the country where the data will be transferred and the permission of the Board are required.

Blockchain networks are inherently global and independent of geographical borders. The nodes in an Ethereum or Bitcoin network may be scattered all over the world. In this case, any data written to the chain (even the hash of a DID or a VC) can technically be considered to be transferred abroad. This has the potential to make the use of SSI systems almost impossible under current GDPR rules.

To overcome this problem, existing mechanisms such as Binding Corporate Rules (BCR) should be adapted to decentralized systems or new data transfer mechanisms and standards specific to these technologies should be developed by the Board.

2.2. Comparison with Electronic Signature Law No. 5070 and e-Government

The Electronic Signature Law No. 5070, one of the cornerstones of Turkey's digital infrastructure, is based on a centralized trust model. The philosophical and technical difference between this model and the decentralized trust model introduced by SSI constitutes one of the most critical challenges of the legal harmonization process.

2.2.1. Authentication with DID/VC vs. Secure Electronic Signature: Conflict of Trust Models

Law No. 5070 defines "secure electronic signature" as the only type of digital signature that produces the same legal result as a handwritten wet signature. In order for an electronic signature to be considered "secure", it must meet the four conditions listed in the law. The most important and decisive of these conditions is that the signature must be based on a "qualified electronic certificate (QEC)". A QEC can only be issued by Electronic Certificate Service Providers (ECSPs) authorized by the Information and Communication Technologies Authority (ICTA). This is a hierarchical and institutional trust model where trust flows from the top down, from central institutions authorized by the state to the users.

In contrast, authentication using a DID and VC is based on a completely different philosophy: decentralized and cryptographic trust. A verifier trusts the validity of a VC not because the issuer is a government-authorized CSP, but because the digital signature on the VC mathematically matches the public key that the issuer has declared in a public ledger (such as a blockchain). The source of trust is not the status of an organization, but the cryptographic proof that is deemed impossible to break.

Due to this fundamental difference in philosophy, a VC presentation, no matter how cryptographically secure, cannot be considered a "secure electronic signature" under the current definition of Law No. 5070. This is because it is not based on an QEC obtained from an authorized ECSP.

In this case, the verification process performed with a DID/VC cannot be considered a secure e-signature in the status of a promissory note, which is "conclusive evidence" under the Code of Civil Procedure (CPL). However, this does not mean that the transaction has no legal value. Courts may accept such a verification as "preliminary evidence" or "discretionary evidence" that strongly establishes the parties and the content of the transaction.

The real strategic question for Turkey is not "Is a VC equivalent to an e-signature?" but rather "Can the Turkish legal system evolve to recognize and give legal consequences to a decentralized cryptographic trust model as well as a centralized corporate trust model?".

2.2.2. e-Government Integration Scenarios

Turkey's announcement of a blockchain-based identity and e-wallet project for e-Government presents a tremendous opportunity for the adoption of this new technology. Instead of being a competitor to the existing e-Government infrastructure, SSI-based systems can be positioned as a layer that complements and strengthens it.

Complementary Model. In this model, e-Government and other public institutions (Population Directorate, Land Registry and Cadastre Directorate, Higher Education Council, etc.) assume the role of a trusted "Issuer". Citizens can download their verified official information from these institutions (residence certificate, population registration sample, diploma, land registry, etc.) to their digital wallets in VC format. They can then use these VCs for transactions in the private sector (opening a bank account, applying for a loan, applying for a job, an insurance policy) without the need to log in to e-Government again and again and by protecting their privacy (e.g. by sharing only the necessary information with ZKP). This is a great convenience for citizens and reduces the costs of identity verification for the private sector.

In addition to the existing methods (password, e-signature, mobile signature, banking applications) for logging in to the e-Government Gateway, the "Login with Wallet" option can be added. In this method, the e-Government system sends a cryptographic "challenge" to the user's wallet, and the user's wallet produces a "response" by signing this challenge with its private key. This successful cryptographic handshake securely authenticates the identity of the user and allows them to log into the system.

2.3. Evaluation from the Perspective of Law of Obligations and Evidence

SSI and smart contracts will have significant impacts on the formation and proof of contracts, which form the basis of private law relations.

2.3.1. Validity of Smart Contracts (Turkish Code of Obligations - TCO)

Smart contracts are computer codes that operate automatically without the need for an intermediary institution between the parties when pre-programmed conditions are met. According to the Turkish Code of Obligations No. 6098, the basic element for the establishment of a contract is the mutual and appropriate expression of the parties' wills (offer and acceptance). The rule under the TCO is the principle of freedom of form for contracts.

Pursuant to this principle, an "on-chain" smart contract (established entirely on the blockchain), where the identities of the parties are cryptographically verified by DID and the terms of the contract are expressed in code, should be considered a valid contract under the general provisions of the TCO. The will of the parties is declared through transactions signed with their private keys and these declarations are irreversibly recorded on the blockchain.

This validity applies in cases where the law does not require a special formal requirement. For example, legal transactions such as the sale of real estate (official deed at the land registry office), the sale of a vehicle (at a notary public) or marriage, where the law requires a specific ceremony or the participation of an official, cannot be done with smart contracts under current legal regulations. The use of smart contracts in these areas requires amendments to the relevant laws to recognize this technology.

2.3.2. Evidential Nature of Verifiable Credentials (VCs) (Code of Civil Procedure - CCP)

The probative power of a VC in a legal dispute before the court should be evaluated within the framework of the evidence system in the CCP. The CCP basically divides the evidence into "conclusive evidence" and "discretionary evidence". While conclusive evidence (deed, oath, final judgment) binds the judge, discretionary evidence (witness, expert report, discovery, etc.) is subject to the free evaluation of the judge.

Legal Nature of VC.

    • Considering the broad definition of "document" in Article 199 of the CCP ("...data in electronic media and similar information carriers..."), a VC is undoubtedly a document.
    • According to the CCP, documents signed with a secure electronic signature have the force of a promissory note and are therefore conclusive evidence.
    • As analyzed above, since a VC is not considered to be signed with a "secure electronic signature" within the scope of Law No. 5070, it cannot be directly accepted as a promissory note or conclusive evidence.

In this case, a VC may be characterized as a beginning of evidence under Art. 202 of the CCP. The beginning of evidence is defined as "a document that shows the legal transaction that is the subject of the claim as probable and that is given or sent by the person against whom the claim is asserted or his representative". A VC fits this definition as it is signed with the DID of its issuer (e.g. a university) and shows that a claimed status (such as graduation) is highly probable.

The existence of a prima facie case makes it possible to resort to other discretionary evidence, such as witnesses, even in cases where proof by deed is mandatory. Therefore, although a VC is not conclusive evidence on its own, it has the potential to be accepted as a very strong discretionary evidence and a preliminary piece of evidence that significantly eases the burden of proof in a case.

2.4. Criminal Law and Determination of Liability

Rather than creating new types of crimes, decentralized identity systems pave the way for existing crimes to be committed with new technologies. This situation poses new challenges for both substantive criminal law and criminal procedure.

2.4.1. Blockchain-Based Identity Crimes (Turkish Criminal Code - TCK)

Identity Theft and Unauthorized Access. Obtaining the private key of a person's wallet, controlling his/her DID and making transactions on his/her behalf fall within the scope of IT crimes under the TPC. This action constitutes the crime of "accessing the information system" regulated under Article 243 of the TPC. If the identity data of the person is changed or rendered inaccessible as a result of this entry, the crime of "blocking, disrupting, destroying or changing the data" under Article 244 of the TPC will come to the fore.

Forgery Issuing a forged VC based on a non-existent authorization (for example, creating a forged diploma VC) or falsifying an existing VC constitutes forgery crimes depending on the nature of the document. If the issuer of the VC is a public institution (e.g., the Population Directorate), the crime of "Forgery of an official document" under Article 204 of the TPC is committed; if it is a private institution (e.g., a private university or company), the crime of "Forgery of a private document" under Article 207 of the TPC is committed.

Fraud In the event that fraudulent behavior is used to benefit oneself or another person to the detriment of another person, the crime of "qualified fraud by using information systems, banks or credit institutions as a tool" occurs in accordance with Article 158/1-f of the TPC. This is the most frequently used article in fraudulent acts related to crypto assets.

As a matter of fact, the acts that can be done within the scope of the Penalty are not limited to these examples, but can be increased and diversified.

2.4.2. Attribution and Judgment Difficulties

One of the biggest challenges of blockchain-based systems is identifying the real identity of the perpetrator when a crime is committed. While blockchain transactions are transparent and publicly visible, the parties involved do not use their real identities but pseudonyms, i.e. wallet addresses. This makes it difficult to find out who the real person behind the wallet address associated with a crime is.

Investigative authorities (prosecution and law enforcement) will often have to rely on off-chain data and traditional cybercrime investigation methods to identify the perpetrator. These methods include:

  • Identification of the IP address used by the perpetrator to make transactions.
  • "Know Your Customer" from centralized cryptocurrency exchanges where the perpetrator converts cryptocurrencies into legal currency (KYC) information requested.
  • Tracking traces on social media and other digital platforms.

While the decentralized structure makes this process more complex than in classic cybercrime, it does not make it impossible. However, this requires investigative authorities to develop special expertise in blockchain analysis and digital forensics.

2.5. Evaluation within the Scope of Capital Markets Legislation (CMB)

Identity tokenization may fall under the purview of Capital Markets Board (CMB) legislation, especially when financial rights are attached to these tokens. The main factor determining the legal nature of a token is not its technical standard (NFT, SBT, etc.), but the economic function it represents.

2.5.1. Identity Token vs. Capital Market Instrument

Non-Capital Market Instrument Tokens. If a token only represents a credential (diploma), an access right (event ticket), a status (DAO membership) or a reputation (merit badge) and does not promise any financial return, partnership rights, dividends or interest to its holder, it is considered a "utility token" or a reputation token and is outside the scope of the CMB legislation.

Tokens that are Capital Market Instruments. If a token gives the holder

  • A share of a company's profits (similar to a share certificate),
  • Receiving principal and interest payments at the end of a specified term (bonds/bond-like),
  • Sharing in the future revenues of a project,

If the token offers a financial right or expectation, such token is considered a "capital market instrument" (especially a security or securitized asset) under the Capital Markets Law No. 6362. In this case, the public offering, issuance and intermediation of the purchase and sale of these tokens are subject to the permission and supervision of the CMB. Unauthorized issuance may constitute unauthorized public offering or capital market activity offenses.

2.5.2 Gray Area: ERC-6551 and Combinability

The combinability introduced by the ERC-6551 standard further complicates this distinction. For example, a "Citizenship NFT" created purely as an identity document can accumulate other tokens that are securities or yield-generating digital assets through its own wallet (TBA). In this case, the identity token, which is initially not a capital market instrument, may eventually become the carrier of a financial portfolio.

Such hybrid structures create new "gray areas" for the CMB and other regulators that require careful consideration. This situation demonstrates once again that regulations should focus not on the "asset" but on the "function offered by the asset".


Conclusion: The Future of Digital Sovereignty and Turkey's Search for Direction

Blockchain-based digital identity systems are not just a technical innovation, but a profound paradigmatic break that redefines identity, data and authority relations in the individual-state-corporate triangle of the digital age. The Self-Sovereign Identity (SSI) model is based on individualizing, not centralizing, the individual's control over their data, while transforming the role of states and institutions from data collectors to trusted verifiers.

Decentralized identifiers (DIDs), verifiable credentials (VCs) and token-based structures (NFT/SBT/ERC-6551), which form the technical foundation of this new model, offer groundbreaking possibilities in many areas from interoperability to privacy, ownership to governance. They also offer architectural solutions to structural problems such as data breaches, identity theft and digital censorship.

However, of course, this technological revolution does not automatically gain legal legitimacy. On the contrary, unless the relationship of this new structure with existing legal orders is properly established, its potential benefits will not only be limited, but its risks will increase and opportunities will be wasted. In the case of Turkey, the effective and safe implementation of these technologies requires a holistic transformation on at least three levels:

Turkey has an open window of opportunity. This window is the opportunity to build a new generation identity infrastructure that is integrated with global standards, citizen-oriented, secure and privacy-based, without being dependent on the classical model based on centralized authority in digital identity. This structure will not only protect the digital rights of the individual, but will also strengthen Turkey's digital sovereignty and pave the way for Web3-based innovation and entrepreneurship.