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The Crime of Disposing of Another Person's Trademark Rights by Transferring, Licensing, or Pledging Them Without Authorization


31 January 2026 - Av. Esin Esen

The Crime of Disposing of Another Person's Trademark Rights by Transferring, Licensing, or Pledging Them Without Authorization

According to Article 30, Paragraph 3 of the Industrial Property Law, "A person who disposes of another person's trademark rights by transferring, licensing, or pledging them without authorization shall be punished with imprisonment for two to four years and a judicial fine of up to five thousand days." This study briefly evaluates the crime regulated in SMK.30/1, particularly with regard to computer programs.

The crime regulated in SMK.30/3 can occur in three different ways with regard to computer programs. These include selling or transferring the trademark of the software to another company under a contract without being the registered owner, leasing or making available the trademark rights of the software to third parties under the name of "license" without authorization from the actual rights holder, and presenting a software trademark owned by another person as collateral in exchange for a commercial credit or debt. The regulations in the Copyright Law and the regulation in SMK.30/3 can easily blur the line when it comes to these acts. It should be noted that Article 30/3 of the SMK directly protects the right of disposal over the trademark (Atalan, 2017). For example, a developer who legally uses the source code of a software but does not have the right to use or transfer the trademark would be committing the crime regulated in Article 30/3 of the SMK by transferring this trademark to another party. Another typical example of this crime is when a former employee of a software company or a distributor whose authorization has expired signs new license agreements by presenting the trademark usage rights as if they still belong to them. Since a license may cover a wide range of issues, such as the use, distribution, publication, addition of innovations, translations, or code to the computer program, or the establishment of a joint venture, the parties may freely determine the scope of the authorization relating to the computer program covered by the license agreement within the scope of contractual freedom. However, the scope of the authorization may also be subject to restrictions in terms of place and time. In cases where the agreement is breached in this respect, it is debatable whether the offense regulated in SMK.30/3 has been committed (Yelmen, 2020). To determine whether this crime has been committed, the logs of license management systems (LMS), email traffic, blockchain-based license records, and digital contract signatures (e-signature/time stamp) constitute evidence.

The sanction envisaged in SMK.30/3 has been criticized in practice and doctrine. In an application to the Constitutional Court, it was argued that SMK.30/3 violates the principle set forth in Article 38 of the Constitution, "No one shall be deprived of their liberty solely for failing to fulfill an obligation arising from a contract," and the principle of last resort prevailing in criminal law. It was argued that if linking an act to a criminal sanction causes more harm to society than the act itself, the purpose of criminal law is defeated, and therefore the relevant provision should be annulled. However, in its decision dated March 28, 2018, numbered 2017/172 E., 2018/32 K., the Constitutional Court rejected this application and ruled that the relevant articles did not violate the Constitution. The decision summarized that the protection of individuals' property rights and the duty to prevent interference from third parties are the state's obligations under the Constitution, that intellectual and industrial rights, along with movable and immovable property, constitute the subject matter of property rights, that the authority to determine the procedure and method for protecting trademark rights, which constitute the subject matter of property rights, belongs to the legislature, in this respect, there is no aspect contrary to the Constitution in determining acts constituting infringement of trademark rights as unfair competition or crime, and the legal and criminal sanctions for acts constituting infringement of trademark rights are clearly specified in the law, there is no legal uncertainty regarding the relevant rules, nor is there any violation of the principle of legality of crimes and penalties; considering that the crime of trademark infringement is subject to complaint and effective repentance provisions, the sanctions are appropriate for the intended purpose; there is a reasonable relationship between the purpose and the means, and in this context, they are in line with the principle of proportionality. It has been stated that the provisions regulating the acts constituting trademark infringement and the related legal and criminal sanctions, the annulment of which is requested, are not contrary to the Constitution.

Sources:

Atalan, M. (2017). Trademark Infringement Crimes in the Industrial Property Law (IPL Art. 30). Ankara Bar Association Journal, 4, 45-88.

Yelmen, A. (2020). Evaluations Regarding Confidentiality Provisions in License Agreements Related to Computer Programs. Dokuz Eylül University Law Faculty Journal 22(2), 991-1019.